The purpose of this paper is to investigate the responsiveness of the demand for college to changes in student aid arising from a Danish reform. Student aid in Denmark is means-tested, so accounting for borrowing contraints in the analysis is crucial. We separately identify the e¤ect of aid from that of other observed and unobserved variables such as parental income. For the Danish case, we exploit the combination of a kinked aid scheme and the reform of the student aid scheme to identify the e¤ect of direct costs on college enrollment. We …nd that enrollment is less responsive than found in other studies and that the presence of borrowing constraints is neither statistically or economically important.
Introduction
An increase in educational subsidies is expected to increase college enrollment. Despite the substantial educational subsidies are already in place, previous empirical work suggests the elasticity is large. Empirical studies for the U.S. …nd that the magnitude of the e¤ect is such that a $1000 increase in the annual educational subsidy increases enrollment by roughly 3-5 percentage points (see e.g. Dynarski, 2003; Lesslie and Brinkman, 1988; Manski and Wise, 1983; McPherson and Shapiro, 1991) . The purpose of this paper is to investigate the responsiveness of the demand for college to changes in student aid by exploiting some useful exogenous variation in Danish data.
The crucial issue in studies of the e¤ect of …nancial aid on enrollment is to separately identify the e¤ect of aid from that of other observed and unobserved variables such as parental background. First, student aid is most often means tested against parental income and other socioeconomic variables. Second, responsiveness of demand for college to changes in student aid is likely to vary with parental background for many reasons. In particular, one might expect college enrollment to be particularly responsive to educational subsidies among families who are borrowing constrained (see e.g. Cameron and Taber, 2004) . In this paper we exploit the combination of a kinked aid scheme and a reform of the student aid scheme to identify the e¤ect of direct costs on college enrollment accounting for borrowing constraints.
We exploit two data characteristics to identify the e¤ect of educational subsidy separately from the e¤ect of parental income. First, we use the nonlinear relationship between the income of the parents and the amount of aid for which students are eligible.
Second, we use information about an extensive reform of the educational grant system which was implemented for the cohort starting at university September 1st, 1988. We show that, theoretically, the …rst characteristic is su¢ cient to identify the e¤ect of interest, although, we …nd that the variation caused by the reform aids identi…cation in practice.
The reform consisted of two major changes: it reduced the age limit above which you could receive grants independently of parental income and -most importantly -it raised the levels of grants by more than 25% for all students above 19 years of age. The exact amount and relative change in aid varied a lot depending on the income of the parents. After the reform, educational subsidies universally covered almost all students throughout their college education at a generous level 1 .
Children with poor parents (henceforth: poor kids) are often found to be more responsive to educational subsidies than the children of rich parents (henceforth: rich kids). This …nding may work through (at least) three di¤erent channels.
(1) Poor kids are likely to be borrowing constrained, therefore, they would be more a¤ected by an increase in subsidies than rich kids. (2) Poor kids may receive lower schooling contingent transfers from their parents. Public transfers likely crowd out some schooling contingent transfers from parents. That would lead to a lower college enrollment response of rich kids to a reduction in public transfers than that for poor kids. (3) Poor kids receive less non-labor income over their life time than the rich kids. That may be due to lower non-contingent transfers from their family when they are young or due to less bequests.
This implies that the marginal utility of income is higher for poor kids than for rich kids who have higher non-labor income. As a result, they are more sensitive to a reduction in costs.
We adopt the low liquid asset measure, which was suggested by Zeldes (1989) and succesfully applied by Leth-Pedersen (2004) , to control for borrowing constraints. Their argument is that the ratio of liquid assets to income indicates whether the household face a binding credit constraint -either due to an adverse income shock or due to the fact that assets have been run down in the past.
We use Danish register-based data for the cohorts graduating from high school in 1985 to 1990. In this way we have data both before and after the reform. We rank 1 We use the terms grant, stipend and student aid interchangeably.
individuals according to the index of parental income which determines eligibility for student aid, and match post-reform individuals with pre-reform individuals at the same place in the income distribution. 2 The fact that the relationship between this measure of parental income -and hence the rank in the distribution of parental income -and the stipend is nonlinear helps us to identify the relationship of interest. We show formally that the relationship between family income and college enrollment should jump at the kink point which allows us to identify the e¤ect of the reform. Basically, we analyze whether the family income/college enrollment relationship changed systematically di¤erently around the kink points.
We …nd that the subsidy did increase college enrollment, but at a lower rate than in previous work. The point estimates indicate that a $1,000 increase in the stipend increases college enrollment by 1-3 percentage points. The con…dence band rules out estimates as large as found in the previous literature. To analyze whether this is partly due to the fact that part of the students are borrowing constrained whereas others are not, we introduce the low liquid asset indicator. We …nd some evidence that borrowing constraints deter enrollment. The reported results are conditional on an assumption that the supply is completely ‡exible. If a supply constraint has been binding, a demand increase should show up in 'prices' which (in the Danish case) would be entry requirements in terms of GPA. We argue that demand response did not a¤ect prices signi…cantly.
Our next goal is to interpret the …ndings in the context of a simple structural model allowing for borrowing constraints. Our point estimates from a preliminary version of the model indicate that borrowing constrained individuals face interest rates only slightly higher than other individuals.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 surveys the literature.
Section 3 describes the reform while section 4 documents the data. Section 5 presents the empirical analysis and section 6 concludes the paper.
Literature survey
The literature attempting to identify the e¤ect of costs on college attendance is long and diverse. In an older review of the literature, Leslie and Brinkman (1988) conclude that the estimated e¤ect on college attendance of a $1000 dollar aid increase ranges from three to …ve percentage points. The results from the earlier studies are, however, likely to be ‡awed by poor identi…cation, as aid is correlated with numerous observable and unobservable variables.
Comparing enrollment rates across states, Kane (1995) …nds that a $1000 dollar di¤erence in costs of public 2-year college is associated with a 19-29% di¤erence in enrollment rates (8-16 percentage points) among 18-19 year-olds. Conditioning on 2-year tuition, the e¤ect of tuition in public 4-year college is positive, although insigni…cant, indicating that the marginal price determining whether or not people attend college at all is public 2-year college tuition and not 4-year college tuition. The major weakness of this cross-state comparison is that identi…cation is based upon di¤erences between states which have been fairly stable over time, making it di¢ cult to separate the e¤ect of tuition from other …xed between-state di¤erences. Exploiting within-state di¤erences in public tuition increases since 1980, the same study estimates a 3.5 percentage point drop in public undergraduate enrollment following a $1000 dollar increase in public 2-year tuition. Furthermore, the gap in enrollment between high-and low-income youth grew the most in the states with the largest tuition increases, hinting at the presence of borrowing constraints. Surprisingly, the study …nds no signi…cant e¤ect of implement-
ing the federal means-tested Pell Grant programme in the mid-seventies, leading to the hypothesis of supply constraints muting the e¤ect of the supposedly increased college demand on actual enrollment. This …nding is consistent with the in ‡uential study of Hansen (1983) . Later, Turner (1998) rationalized this missing e¤ect by large aid budget institutions "undoing"the targeting of the federal grants.
McPherson and Schapiro (1991) exploit the availability of 11 years of observations and …nd a signi…cant e¤ect of changes of the Pell Grant. A $1000 dollar increase in net costs (1978) (1979) dollars) is estimated to reduce the enrollment of low-income students by 6.8 percentage points.
Exploiting annual micro-data from the CPS, Seftor and Turner (2002) examine the e¤ect of changes in the Pell Grant programme on mature students, and …nd this group to be more responsive to changes than traditional college-goers. More severe borrowing constraints for the mature students might justify this.
The elimination of the Social Security Student Bene…t Program, which subsidized students of deceased, disabled, or retired parents, provides Dynarski (2003) with a source of exogenous variation in schooling costs. The e¤ect of a $1000 dollar subsidy on the enrollment probability is estimated to be 3.6 percentage points using a "di¤erence-in-di¤erences"identi…cation strategy.
The previously mentioned results mainly apply to students from low-income families, in that the youth subsidized by the Pell programme and to a large extent also those subsidized by the Social Security Student Bene…t Program comes from low-income families. Dynarski (2000) studies the Georgia HOPE programme, which mainly a¤ected middle-and upper-income students because any federal (means-tested) grants were deducted from the HOPE stipends. This programme allowed free attendance at Georgia's public colleges for state residents with at least a B average in high school. Using out-ofstate as well as in-state control groups, Dynarski estimates that a $1000 dollar subsidy increase raise enrollment rates of middle-and upper-income students by 4-6 percentage Klaauw reveals an enrollment elasticity of 8.6% for applicants who also …led for federal aid, whereas the elasticity for non-…lers is estimated to be 1.3%. This di¤erence in responsiveness is taken as an indication of borrowing constraints. Changes of educational policy often a¤ect a signi…cant part of the population.
Therefore, it is crucial to consider the supply side of the sector and not only the demand side, and in addition, general equilibrium e¤ects might ‡aw the results derived from a partial analysis. Supply side considerations are rarely discussed explicitly in the studies, although e.g. Turner (1998) and Kane (1995) point to supply side e¤ects as causing otherwise non-intuitive results. General equilibrium e¤ects are analyzed by
Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998), who …nd that taking into account the tax …nanc-ing of the college grant and the e¤ect on relative wages, may reduce the e¤ect of tuition on enrollment by a factor 10.
The Reform
To identify the e¤ect of educational subsidies on enrollment into college, we exploit the reform of the Danish Government Grant Policy which took place in 1988. In Denmark, three types of college education are available: short-cycle, medium-cycle and long-cycle higher education programmes. Table 1 gives a brief overview of the three. In this paper, we focus on enrollment into any college education.
All colleges are public institutions and free of charge. Student grants and loans are universal in the sense that they are given to all students admitted to recognized educational institutions independently of their quali…cations. Grants are means-tested for students below a certain age limit, whereas students above the age limit receive grants independently of their parents' income. For the present research project, we have access to the means-testing algorithm, and the exact income measures needed to check for eligibility.
Before the reform the subsidy was means-tested based on the following index, X;
for all individuals below a certain age limit:
where Income is taxable income, Number of Siblings denotes the number of siblings below the age limit who are undertaking education, a is annually adjusted to account for in ‡ation, and f () is a nonlinear function of parents'wealth which also varies over time. If parents are divorced, we assume that the individual is associated with the parent with the lowest taxable income. Until 1987, the subsidy was means-tested for individuals below the age limit 22. That is, before age 22 the amount of the subsidy depended on the index X; but all students age 22 and higher are eligible for the full subsidy. As a …rst step before the major reform of the student aid system, the subsidy was means-tested only for individuals below the age limit 20 in 1987. 3 The actual reform was announced in 1987 and it was implemented for the cohort starting at college September 1st, 1988. 4 After the reform, educational subsidies universally covered almost all students throughout their college education. The level of economic support was high enough to su¢ ce for living. The reform consisted of two major changes: First, it reduced the age limit above which you could receive grants independently of X to 19 years. This meant that only the very few students who were born after August 1st and followed the fastest possible way through the educational system were means-tested for the …rst one or two quarters of their studies 5 . Second, and most importantly, the reform raised the levels of grants by more than 25% for all students above 19 years of age. The increase was largest for those who were not eligible before the reform. Those with the largest parental incomes -and therefore the largest values of X -went from no grant at all (as long as they were under the age of 22) to 48.968 DDK per year (2001 prices), which roughly compares to $8000 per year.
In Figure 1 , we sketch the in ‡uence of the reform on the aid scheme. The main content of the reform was to universally increase the level of the stipend. The lower line (beginning at s 1 ) represents the initial stipend while the higher (at level s 2 ) represents the post reform stipend. One can see that prior to the reform individuals with X < x 1 were eligible for the maximum bene…t of s 1 : This bene…t started to phase out at level 3 The 1987 change was …rst negotiated in February 1986 and it was passed in June 1986 in due time to in ‡uence the decisions of the 1986 cohort. 4 According to the Parliament's yearbooks the law was …rst proposed in Parliament on 18/11-1986, whereas it was …nally agreed upon on 23/4-1987 (see the Parliament's yearbook 1985-1986 and the Parliament's yearbook 1986-1987). Hence the 1987-cohort of high school graduates were the …rst ones to know about the reform when they made their career decisions. 5 We exclude individuals who do not turn 19 in the year they graduate from high school. This group is small and they are likely to have a systematically di¤erent behaviour.
x 1 until level x 2 . Students from families with X > x 1 received no stipend. After the reform everyone was eligible for the higher level. As a result, one can see that the net e¤ect of the reform was larger for individuals for whom the pre-reform means-test was binding (i.e. X > x 1 ) but that the reform a¤ected everyone.
Data

Data source
We use a register-based data set covering 10% We augment the data with a prediction of the amount of grant which each individual would be eligible for, if they enter college immediately after high school graduation. We apply the algorithm which the authorities have used to compute grants for the students (see Section 3).
In order to account for potential borrowing constraints, we add information about the parents'liquid assets: the amount of assets held in cash, stocks, bonds, mortgage deeds and other assets. 6 We are going to supplement this dataset with the individuals who do not enroll in high school after the 9th grade. We would like to check whether the conclusions are similar if we do not condition on high school graduation.
Data description
In Table 2 we present enrollment rates at college for each of the high school graduation to adjust their behavior, and it was preceded by a change in the age of eligibility for full grant independently of parental income (or more precisely: independently of the variable X which was de…ned above) which was announced in time for cohort 1986 to adjust their behavior. Table 2 indicates that the reform of 1988 has in ‡uenced enrollment since enrollment of cohorts graduating in years 1988 and 1990 were systematically higher one year after high school graduation and onwards. However, the level was larger in 1990 than earlier on.
In Table 3 , we present summary statistics for the micro data set by graduation year. We exclude the 7-8% of individuals for whom information about the parents is unavailable. They are no di¤erent than the rest of the sample in terms of high school graduation age and college enrollment rates. Table 3 shows that the average high school graduation age is stable around 19.4 years. Average GPA is unobserved for 20-30% of the sample, and therefore we create an indicator for missing GPA and include that in the estimations. If observed, the average GPA is just above 8 and slightly increasing over the cohorts, which probably indicates grade in ‡ation. 7 In Table 3 , we report two low liquid asset indicators, D1 and D2. Liquid assets include all non-housing assets, that is cash, shares, bonds, mortgage deeds, shares in ships and other assets. 8 The basic indicator, D1, takes the value one if parents'liquid assets falls short of one months' income, whereas the extreme indicator, D2, takes the value one if the parents'liquid assets falls short of two months'income. Roughly 50% of the sample have liquid assets below one months income, and roughly 60% have liquid assets below two months income. Those are the parents we regard as potentially borrowing constrained. However, for parents who are self-employed, the amount of liquid assets is not registered, therefore, we separately account for this in the empirical analysis by two alternative approaches: Whenever we use the low liquid asset indicator,
we include an indicator for whether one's parents were self-employed in the year before graduation or we exclude the self-employed from the analysis.
In Table 4 , we present the average composition of the parents' portfolio by high school graduation cohort. Cash dominates the portfolio and takes up roughly half of the portfolio in most years, whereas other assets (such as yachts, cars, campers and other taxable assets) is the second largest element. In Table 5 , we present the average composition of the parents'portfolio by the two low liquid asset indicators. It is seen that the potentially borrowing constrained individuals -with D1=1 or D2=1 -hold a much higher proportion of their wealth in cash. The parents who have liquid assets of less than one months'income, and thereby falls short of the basic split, hold as much as 84% of their wealth in cash. The parents who have liquid assets of less than two months'income, and thereby falls short of the extreme split, hold 74% of their wealth in cash. The least constrained group with D2=0 hold only 30% in cash, 36% in other assets and roughly 11% in mortgage deeds, 12% in bonds and 12% in shares. It seems reasonable to us that a group with this portfolio composition would not be borrowing constrained.
Empirical Results
To exploit the variation provided by the reform, we need to predict whether individuals who are observed post-reform would be eligible for student aid had they graduated prereform. To avoid restrictive untestable assumptions about income growth for the parents over the six year period, we make the assumption that (counterfactual) eligibility for student aid for the post-reform individuals had they graduated from high school before the reform, is determined by their place in the income distribution. Therefore, we rank individuals according to the measure of parental income, X, which determines eligibility for student aid, and predict the amount of aid an individual would have been eligible for before the reform by assuming that his parents would have been at the same point in the income distribution at that time. Thus, we are able to predict the magnitude of the "treatment" provided by the reform for each individual. In a sense we are just controlling for the distribution of income and not allowing it to determine the e¤ect of the reform.
Speci…cally we de…ne the variable, S i to be the proportion of the maximum stipend for which the individual would be eligible in 1985 9 . Thus, for an individual from a pre-reform cohort, S i is exactly the stipend that individual would have received if he or she had gone to college. That is, we have the same administrative data used to determine the subsidy so we know this variable exactly. For an individual post reform we use the following procedure:
1. Calculate X i 2. Determine the quantile of X i for the current cohort 3. Obtain the corresponding quantile of X for the pre-reform cohort, call it x pre i :
4. Calculate S i as the subsidy corresponding to X = x pre i using the 1985 rule.
Since it is de…ned as the proportion of the maximum stipend it varies from zero to one. This is the key variable in our analysis.
Standard di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimation
The design of the grant scheme and the reform of the grant system provides us with some di¤erent sources of variation as is clear from Figure 1 . Before the reform, the grant varied within each cohort across X. However, this variation is clearly not exogenous as the level of grant was tightly linked to the …nancial situation of the parents, which for many reasons are likely to be correlated with the individuals educational behavior. The reform of the grant system is, however, exogenous in the sense that those graduating from high school before the reform most likely are very similar to those graduating after the reform. The reform provides variation over time, and since we are going to exclude the two high school graduation cohorts to avoid announcement e¤ects, we end up with a considerable time span between the treatment group (post-reform high school graduates) and the control group (pre-reform graduates). Ideally one would like a control group not exposed to the reform to facilitate a di¤erence-in-di¤erence strategy to prevent macro or year e¤ects from driving the results. However, the universal nature of the grant system and the reform preclude such a control, since all potential students are a¤ected by the reform. Although we have no group who are una¤ected by the reform, we still have variation in the treatment provided by the reform. As seen in Figure 1 , the magnitude of the treatment is tied to the grant which an individual would have been eligible for before the reform. Therefore, we compare individuals based on the amount of grant eligible for before the reform, and then expect those who would have received lower grants to respond more strongly to the reform, since they experience larger treatments.
That is we can estimate the model
where C i is a dummy variable indicating college enrollment within one year of graduation, R i is a dummy variable determining whether the individual was a member of a post-reform cohort, G i is a full array of cohort dummy variables, X i is the index of parent's income that determine the subsidy, Z i is a vector other socioeconomic variables that were controlled for, and is the c.d.f. of a standard Normal random variable. The key variable in the analysis is 2 which should be negative as the individuals receiving the smallest subsidies ex-ante were the largest bene…ciaries of the reform (see Figure   1 ). Table 6 summarizes the results from probit models based on equation ( Both the pre-reform grant and the magnitude of the treatment induced by the reform are tightly linked to the …nancial situation of the parents. In speci…cation (1) in Table 6 , we include the income percentile of the parents in the probit regression, and we see a 8.6 percentage point higher enrollment for the individuals at the top of the income distribution compared to the individual at the very bottom of the distribution. Hence, we allowed children of "rich"parents to have a di¤erent, presumably higher, enrollment rate than children of "poor"parents. However, we assumed that they for a given change in the stipend respond to the same extent. In other word, we allowed the rich and poor to di¤er in levels, but not in their sensitivity to net costs of college.
This is a major issue if one is worried about borrowing constraints, di¤erent income e¤ects, and contingent parental transfers. All of these arguments suggest that the responsiveness to changes in net costs might depend on the …nancial conditions of the family. If this is the case, since individuals with higher values of X i bene…tted more from the program we are understating the true e¤ect of stipend on the demand for college. To income to have a di¤erent e¤ect after the reform than before the reform 10 .
Accounting for borrowing constraints: A regression kink design
We control for the parents' …nancial situation by including their position in the income distribution. If we believe that, for instance, borrowing constraints or contingent parental transfers have a signi…cant e¤ect on enrollment, then it is crucial to allow the response to the subsidy to vary with income. However, allowing for this hinges on being able to separate the e¤ect of the subsidy from that of the parents'…nancial conditions.
In our case, pre-reform stipend (and the treatment following the reform) and parents' income are strongly correlated, as the former is a function of the latter. Generally, this would force identi…cation to come from an assumption about the functional relationship between income and enrollment. However, the means-testing algorithm provide us with a kink in the relationship between parents'income and the grant eligible for. This kink could be exploited for non-parametric identi…cation.
Consider the following general speci…cation in which Y i represents a generic dependent variable,
where X i is a continuous variable and S i is the treatment variable which we treat as continuous here. The main issue for identi…cation is that S i is completely determined
The standard problem one faces in this type of analysis is that u i is correlated with X i (and thus S i ): However, suppose that there is a kink in the function S at some value x , but not in the function g(X i ; ) or the function E (u i j X i ). To simplify, we assume that g(X i ; ) and E (u i j X i ) are continuous di¤erentiable. De…ne
Hence, this treatment e¤ect is nonparametrically identi…ed at the kink points. In practice, one must use more parameterized models to obtain reasonable precision. But still, the di¤erence in sensitivity to income changes between those just to the left of the kink point and those just to the right of it, can provide identi…cation. Thus, theoretically, the treatment e¤ect is identi…ed even when we allow the e¤ect of parental income to be di¤erent after the reform. In practice, data will determine whether we have su¢ cient power to separate S i from parental income X i :
In Figure 3 , we will show kernel regressions of enrollment on the income percentile of the parents cohort by cohort together with a kernel regression of the 1985 stipend on income percentile. 11 Before discussing what one actually sees in the data, …rst consider what one would expect to see if borrowing constraints were important. In Figure 2 we have superimposed the college enrollment rates onto Figure 1 . The two dashed lines present the patterns one would expect if borrowing contraints were important. Consider …rst the pre-reform patterns shown as the lower of the two dashed lines. In the area to the left of x 1 ; all individuals receive the maximum subsidy so we would expect enrollment rates to increase with income due to the borrowing constraints (where in this …gure we have assumed the relationship is linear). In the segment between x 1 and x 2 there are two counteracting forces. As before we have borrowing constraints but balancing that is the fact that the subsidy is phasing out which should lead to a more negative slope. We have drawn the …gure so the second e¤ect dominates and the slope is negative which it does not have to be. What is crucial is the slope in this segment should be less steep than in the segment with X < x 1: Finally, when X > x 2 the subsidy is zero, so again all that should matter is the borrowing constraints thus this should again be increasing. In particular the slope should jump right around the kink point x 2 :
The higher of the dotted lines represents the post-reform response. This should have three properties: a) it should be smooth since there are no kink points in the subsidy, 11 We use the LOWESS command in Stata to create this …gure.
b) it should be higher than in the previous line because the subsidy has increase for everyone, c) if borrowing constraints are important, the slope of the line should be less steep because the subsidy should have alleviated borrowing constraints lowering the relationship between income and enrollment. Thus if borrowing constraints are important we should see a bigger impact of the program when we compare individuals with very low income to those with X x 1 and we should also see a bigger impact of the program when we compare individuals with X x 2 to those with high income.
In Figure 3 we present kernel estimates of the analogous to the predictions in Figure   2 . One can see no evidence of many of the patterns we predicted in Figure 2 . The three fattest lines are the post-reform regressions. In the two cohorts 1988 and 1990, the increase with income percentile is relatively abrupt and steep after roughly the 60th
percentile, but for the cohort 1989, the gap between the cohort and the pre-reform cohort is large around the …rst kink but then the gap declines.
To implement this in our probit model, we account for this problem by allowing the slope on Parent's income to vary with the reform
Clearly this is not nonparametric, but we will see that even this restricted model was too imprecise to draw broad conclusions.
The probit regression in speci…cation (2) in Table 6 is based on equation (3). The coe¢ cients of interest change dramatically, but we also see a considerable cut in precision. This indicate that we lack the power in our data to separate the e¤ect of stipend from that of parents'income. The upper bound of the con…dence interval is 0.158 which corresponds to an e¤ect that an increase in $1000 subsidy should increase college enrollment by about 4 percentage points. One can also see that the interaction between Income Percentile and Reform is not signi…cant at conventional levels and goes in the opposite of the predicted direction.
In speci…cation (3) and (4) we exclude youth with at least one self-employed parent.
This leave the qualitative conclusions unchanged although the magnitudes of the e¤ects are smaller. In speci…cation (2) and (4), we allowed borrowing constraints to be picked up by the measure of parents' income. One could argue that a better measure also would take the parents assets and the degree of liquidity of these assets into account.
That we will pursue in the next subsection.
Accounting for borrowing constraints: Using low liquid assets
We adopt a measure of borrowing constraints develped by Zeldes (1989) and used in this Danish data by Leth-Pedersen (2004). The idea is that the borrowing constraint is binding for some households who choose not to build up their liquid wealth in the past or who faced an adverse income shock that forced them to run down liquid assets.
We construct a basic and an extreme indicator for being borrowing constrained: The basic indicator takes the value one if parents' liquid assets falls short of one months' income, whereas the extreme indicator takes the value one if the parents'liquid assets falls short of two months'income. For self-employed the amount of liquid assets is not registered. Therefore, whenever we account for low liquid assets, we either include an indicator for whether the parents were self-employed the year before graduation or we exclude individuals with self-employed parents.
In Table 7 , we present the results of an estimation of the probit model where we control for low liquid assets and interact the low liquid asset indicator with the reform indicator to check whether borrowing constrained individuals reacted di¤erently to the reform than others. We still include the measure of parental income (the position in the income distribution) though we presume that conditional on the indicator of liquid assets the e¤ect of parents income is constant across the reform. Thus the equation now takes the form
where D i is an indicator of being borrowing constrained (either D1 or D2).
In speci…cation (1) in Table 7 , we see that the basic low liquid asset indicator, D1, has a negative coe¢ cient, which may be interpreted as evidence of binding borrowing constraints. We would expect the reform to reduce the extent of borrowing constraints, and this is also what the coe¢ cient to the interaction term between D1 and the reform indicator shows. However, precision is low and the coe¢ cients are not signi…cant at conventional signi…cance levels. In speci…cation (2) we use the extreme low liquid asset indicator, D2, which has a signi…cantly negative e¤ect on enrollment, which disappears after the reform, although the latter result is not signi…cant at normal levels. The indicator for having at least one parent who are self-employed seem to have a similar e¤ect as D1 = 0 or D2 = 0, which means that a self-employed business is like a type of a liquid asset. Therefore, to achieve higher precision, in speci…cation (3) we construct a combined measure of being borrowing constrained which takes the value one for individuals who have (extremely) low liquid assets, i.e. D2 = 1, or no selfemployed parent. The coe¢ cient to this borrowing constraint indicator is -.053 and the e¤ect disappears after the reform -and both e¤ects are signi…cant at normal levels. In speci…cation (4) and (5), we exclude the self-employed, and …nd results that are similar to speci…cation (1) and (2).
The point estimates of the e¤ects suggest that borrowing constraints may matter, although most coe¢ cients are not statistically signi…cant at conventional levels. The overall e¤ect of the key variable, 2 , is modest, suggesting a relatively modest e¤ect of the reform. The point estimate of 2 depends on how we handle the self-employed parents. When kept in the analysis and singled out by an dummy variable, as in speci…cation (1)- (3), we …nd that a change in grants by $4,000 dollars a year change enrollment by 6 percentage points. When the self-employed are entirely omitted from the analysis we estimate an e¤ect of 3 percentage points, cf. speci…cation (4) and (5).
Analysis of capacity constraints
The e¤ect of a change in demand on the observed quantity depends crucially on the supply side (that is the number of openings for students throughout the country). This is also the case in the market for education. To derive the change in demand from changes in observed college enrollment and attainment, we need to know something about the supply side of the educational market or at least make our results conditional on assumptions about supply. The existing literature have, most often, implicitly, assumed a totally ‡exible supply of education, thereby equating demand changes to observed changes in quantities. This approach seems reasonable when studying e¤ects on a limited subset of the population, but when whole cohorts are a¤ected, as in our case, the supply of education might no longer adjust fully to match the increased demand.
Generally, if supply is not perfectly elastic, an increase in demand would lead to price increases. In the Danish educational system, however, education is publicly provided, so there are no direct price mechanism in the educational sector to observe. Thus, we need another observable variable to somehow gauge the elasticity or ‡exibility of the supply. When the demand for a particular education exceeds the study places supplied, the applicants are to a large extent sorted by their high school GPA 12 . When the net return to education increases, we would expect the demand for education to increase for high school graduates with low as well as high GPA. If the supply is totally elastic and follows demand, the composition of those being induced to take further education decide whether the average GPA of enrolled students goes up or down. However, if the supply is …xed we would expect the average GPA of enrolled students to increase, as GPA is the main sorting instrument.
In Figure 4 , which is based on a gross data set for a longer time period, we plot the average high school GPA of …rst-year students for all colleges and for university college. We do not see an unambiguous e¤ect of the reform on the average GPA of enrolled students, but there seem to be a upward trend from 1984 with a slight drop in 1988 and a jump afterwards. This observation might indicate an increased excess demand for education, and, therefore, a wedge between the increase in demand and the increase in actual enrollment. However, the increased average GPA of enrolled students in Figure 4 might just be a result of a time-varying distribution of high school GPA. To accommodate this potential problem, we normalize each student's GPA by the average in his or her high school cohort. Still, the …gures are vulnerable to changes in other moments in the distribution of high school GPA. In Figure 5 we plot the averages of these relative GPAs for …rst-year students. Now the series seem more stationary -still with a slight drop in 1988 and a jump up in 1989 -indicating that the increased enrollment following the reform was not to a considerably extent dampened by an in ‡exible supply.
To conclude, potential supply constraints do not seem to have changed the composition of enrolled students with respect to high school GPA. This analysis is, of course, not perfectly capable of identifying the elasticity of the supply, but with Figure 4 in mind,
we are more con…dent in directly linking changes in observed enrollment to changes in demand for education.
Estimation of Structural Model
In our evidence to this point we have found no strong evidence that borrowing constraints are particularly important and also the reform does not appear to be particularly e¤ective in promoting education. However, without structure it is hard to interpret the estimates that we have. Does our lack of evidence on borrowing constraints result because they are not important or because we have little precision? By putting some simple structure on the model we can gain some insight to this question. In this section we will discuss our extension of this model into a simple structural framework based on Cameron and Taber (2004) . At the time of this writing, we only estimated a preliminary version this model.
Basic Model
Individuals derive utility from consumption and tastes for nonpecuniary aspects of schooling. These nonpecuniary tastes could represent the utility or disutility from school itself or preferences for the menu of jobs available at each level of schooling.
Assuming agents have log utility over consumption in each period, lifetime utility for schooling level S is given by
where c t is consumption at time t, T S represents nonpecuniary tastes for schooling level S, is the subjective rate of time preference. Note that we have abstracted from uncertainty in the model.
De…ning the set of possible schooling choices by S, individuals choose S out of this set so that S = arg max fV S j S 2 Sg :
We follow Cameron and Taber by assuming that people borrow and lend at rate 1 after school, but that while in school students borrow at a rate R that is potentially higher than the market rate. Under schooling level S this yields the budget constraint
where W S is the present value of earnings associated with schooling level S discounted to time S and St represents direct costs of schooling at time t associated with schooling level S net of the subsidy.
Solving for the optimal levels of consumption and plugging back into the utility function yields the following indirect utility function (conditional on schooling):
Our goal is to estimate this model where we allow for heterogeneity in R; St ; and S :
Intuition for Identi…cation
In order to gain an intuition for identi…cation in this model we consider a simple case.
In particular we assume that there are only two levels of schooling,
We keep things simple by supposing there are two periods (T i 2 f0; 1)g), two income types (X i 2 f0; 1)g), and two levels of Asset wealth (D i 2 f0; 1)g). This means that there are a total of 8 di¤erent groups of people. We suppose further that W 1 and W 0 are known but do not vary across time periods or individuals. What is crucial about the model is that we know the form of the subsidy which depends on I i and T i ; let this be S(I i ; T i ).
The general model is
where we have denoted variables that vary across individuals with i subscripts:An in-
Clearly if we allow assets, time, and income to enter R; v;and in a general way there is no way that the model is going to be identi…ed. We need some exclusion restrictions. Lets assume that we can write
where " i has a standard normal distribution.
Lets put this altogether:
One could estimate this model using a nonlinear probit. However it has 9 parameters ( 0 ; 1 ; 0 ; 1 ; 0 ; 1 ; 1 ; 2 ; 3 ) but only 8 degrees of freedom. We can …x that problem in the same way as Cameron and Taber (2004) , namely taking 0 as known. That is they assume that the group with high assets is not borrowing constrained (and represent them as the A i = 0 group). This means that once can estimate 1 but not 0 : This allows us to estimate not the level of the borrowing rate, but rather the ratios of borrowing rates for the constrained and unconstrained groups.
Implementation
We will estimate a slightly more complicated version of model that was exposited in the previous section. In particular we will allow for more than two levels of schooling.
We will also include additional variables like test scores and parent's education into the model and allow it to a¤ect both earnings and tastes for schooling. Denote these variables by X i : We will have more than two groups of time periods and income. Let income be a continuous variable and let time now be a vector of dummy variables.
Thus, we will estimate a model similar to
where Exp i represents experience. The joint distribution of (" 0i ; :::; " Si ) can be speci…ed in a number of ways, for example a nested logit (as in Cameron and Taber, 2004 ).
Estimating the model will be done in two steps. We …rst estimate the present value of earnings by estimating a wage equation and then integrating across time. We then take the predicted values from that regression and estimate the rest of the model using a nonlinear discrete choice model. Once the model is estimated we can look at the ratio of the borrowing rate for the constrained and unconstrained group. This gives us some sense of magnitude and allows us to judge whether our lack of signi…cance results from imprecision or from small e¤ects. We can also use the model to simulate the reaction of enrollment to alternative subsidy programs.
Results
The …rst preliminary results from estimation of the structural model are shown in Table   8 . In the …rst step we predict net present values from a log income regression of annual income on GPA, parental education and gender. In the second step, we estimate a probit model. The market interest rate is assumed to be 4%, and we impose the following restrictions: 0 = 1 = 2 = 0: We …nd an interest rate gap, 1 ; of 0.6%, which is small and economically insigni…cant. This result is very preliminary and more work needs to be done before drawing conclusions from these results.
Conclusion
Empirical studies across time and countries …nd a strong intergenerational correlation in schooling, and more generally a strong relationship between family background and schooling. To make the educational attainment less dependent of the parental background, educational subsidies which are means-tested against parental income have been introduced all over the world. We devote this paper to study how those subsidies in ‡uence the demand for college education.
We …nd that college enrollment increases with increasing subsidy. The point estimate indicate that a $1,000 increase in the stipend increases college enrollment by 1-3 percentage points, which is a signi…cantly lower response than found in the earlier literature. To analyze whether this is partly due to the fact that part of the students are borrowing constrained whereas others are not, we control for low liquid assets and we …nd some evidence that borrowing constraints deter enrollment. The e¤ect is from a statistical point of view borderline signi…cant. To get some idea of whether it is economically signi…cant we estimate a structural model. When we interpret the …ndings in the context of a simple structural model, which allows for borrowing constraints by assuming that constrained students face a higher borrowing rate of interest while undertaking education, our preliminary results suggest that constrained individuals face interest rates slightly higher than other individuals. As in the reduced form model, from a statistical point of view, the gap is borderline signi…cant, but the size of the gap indicates that it is not economically signi…cant. We are cautious to warn the reader that this is a very preliminary result that we will explore much more thoroughly. Table 8 . Results from estimation of a simple structural model. 8, 8 9 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Higher education Universities only Figure 4 : High school GPA of …rst-year students. Higher education Universities only Figure 5 : High school GPA of …rst-year students relatively to high school cohort average.
